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Emergency and disaster situations such as war or terrorism can leave a devastating impact on the mental well-being of
victimized populations. In Israel, the civilian aspects of trauma-related mental distress were first extensively tackled during
the 1980s, and mainly within the terror-stricken Jerusalem and the localities along the northern border. Since then, a
systematic process of trial and error has led to the evolution of emergency mental health services in the country. Over
the course of about forty years, it has grown to be an exemplary one. It is a system deeply rooted in the ground, resulting
from both a change of discourse and a naturalistic process of lesson learning, that is, drawing conclusions from actual
fieldwork. This process and its implications on the mental well-being of Israelis are thoroughly discussed in this research.
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Emergency and disaster situations, such as war or terror-
ism, can result not only in loss of life or damage to prop-
erty and infrastructure, but also with a devastating impact
on the mental well-being of the victimized populations. Ex-
posure to life-threatening situations, either first or second
handed, can increase anxiety and in some cases reach the
status of Acute Stress Reaction (ASR). Untreated, these
cases can deteriorate to Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) and
even Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) [1,2].
In Israel, like in other places around the world, the issue
of mental health in crisis was first studied within a military
context. This includes ’Combat Reaction’ (also known in
the October War as ‘shell shock’), mental reactions of
Prisoner-of-War (POWs), and other battle trauma syn-
dromes. In the early stages of mental care in Israel, the eli-
gibility for state-subsidized psychotherapy was reserved for
individuals who met certain criteria outlined in the national
insurance law, which originally favored shell-shocked vet-
erans and almost disregarded distressed civilians [3].
Civilian aspects of emergency mental health in Israel were
first tackled in light of the frequent attacks by Hezbollah in
Lebanon on the Northern-border settlements in the 1980s,
particularly in the city of Kiryat-Shemona (See Appendix* Correspondence: moranbod@post.tau.ac.il
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flicts described in this paper). During those days, mental
health services were provided to the public through the
outreach of professional personnel to the different districts
of the city. The outreach included shelter visitations, sup-
port groups and ‘get-togethers’ that were aimed at identi-
fying the more severe mental cases, and referring them for
specific treatment plans. Back then, most of this relief
work was performed by voluntary associations and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as The Com-
munity Stress Prevention Centre (a.k.a. “Mashabim”), with
little to no governmental regulation.
An additional example of the efforts made to support
the mental well-being of the victimized population were
the intervention teams that were established following the
April 22nd, 1979 terrorist attack on the northern city of
Naharya. These intervention teams comprised of a com-
bination of medical personnel and social workers, and fi-
nanced by the Ministry of Welfare, could be dispatched
on-call to any location in the northern border to assist
with mental first aid. The concept of these teams was later
adopted by local authorities, and was successfully imple-
mented mostly in terror-stricken Jerusalem and the north-
ern border settlements during the 1980s and 1990s [4].
The First Gulf War (1991) was one of the main cata-
lysts to the introduction of the civilian mental resilience
to the spotlight. [4] For the Israeli home front, this war
involved nocturnal missile attacks on civilian targets, theThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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the threat of a chemical attack, and the compulsory con-
finement of family members in air-sealed, sheltered areas
during missile attacks [5]. While the society as a whole
coped well with the unfamiliar threats, some portions of
the population was in fact mentally affected by the war.
Approximately 43% of the 773 casualties evacuated to
hospitals were diagnosed as psychological casualties and
an additional 27% had mistakenly injected themselves with
atropine, which was provided for the civilian population
as an auto-injected antidote in case of a chemical gas at-
tack [6]. Some of the effects of the attack on the mental
well-being of the Israeli people had far reaching conse-
quences even long after the war was over [7].
The establishment and evolution of the system
The Emergency Mental Health Services have their roots
in the ambulatory services of the mental health clinics,
psychiatric wards of general hospitals and the psychiatric
hospitals in Israel. When the First Intifada (1987–1991)
broke out and an increasing number of victims were in
need of mental assistance, this service was provided
through those existing channels. Overall, and mainly due to
the maladaptation of this system to victims of mass-trauma,
the service provided for psycho-traumatized patients was
relatively poor. In addition, substantial stigmatization of pa-
tients was involved. It became increasingly evident that
there was a need to establish a more suitable solution in the
provision of appropriate mental care to the growing num-
ber of psycho-traumatized victims of the hostilities.
In 1998, a designated department for emergency mental
health services was established in the Ministry of Health.
This division was tasked, among other things, with the es-
tablishment of a new set of services to treat acute stress
and anxiety among civilian casualties of war and terror. As
an initial step, professional workers were trained and edu-
cated to provide mental first aid. This was achieved
through a six-month long course encompassing all aspects
of the field. The aim was to achieve a stream-down effect
in which course trainees would become trainers them-
selves and propagate the knowledge to their peers. In a
later step, protocols and Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) were generated to create a national standardized
approach to mental health care provision during crisis. To
avert the frequent problem of stigmatization associated
with the former and obsolete system, a decision was made
to treat ASR cases in the Emergency Room (ER) of general
hospitals. This was called for because casualties from the
terror scene were frequently taken to the ERs, and it was
deemed reasonable to have the mental health interven-
tions there as well. To institutionalize this approach, two
SOPs were generated. The first dealt with the erection of
ER Stress Site (ERSS) during crisis, and the second, with
the coupling of specific psychiatric hospitals with specificgeneral hospitals that do not possess a psychiatric ward
for assistance with professional caregivers. These proce-
dures outlined certain guidelines for the operation of the
ERSS, such as the number and composition of operating
staff, the mandatory screening of all patients admitted to
the ER for ASR at the ERSS, etc.
The psychotherapy protocol employed in the ERSS con-
centrated on debriefing of the traumatic event. Victims were
encouraged to describe and discuss their experiences as part
of the treatment protocol. Since the therapy was taking place
within an operating ER, use of medication for tranquiliz-
ing distressed patients was common, including the use of
Benzodiazepines. It was not until several years later that
accumulated experience and scientific research revealed
that both methods were counterproductive in preventing
ASD and PTSD, and may actually impede recovery [8].
During the second Intifada (2000–2003), it became
clear that the ERSS system was insufficient in providing
a comprehensive solution to the problem. On the one
hand, the close proximity of the ERSS to the ER created
an unnecessary burden on the medical staff of the ER,
and on the other hand, it allowed ERSS admitted pa-
tients to be exposed to traumatic images of casualties
who were treated in the ER, which usually worsened
their condition. As a result, a decision was made to re-
move the ERSS from the ER to a separate location, still
within the hospital premises, in order to mitigate both
adverse effects - relieving the workload of the ER staff,
and shielding patients admitted to the Stress Site from
further exposure to detrimental conditions. These proto-
cols for operating the Stress Site are still valid ordi-
nances in Israeli hospitals for the accommodation of any
patient seeking mental relief upon admittance to the ER.
The steep rise in the rate of civilians seeking mental as-
sistance during the Second Intifada, coupled with the strict
regulations of the national insurance law, which were not
in favor of casualties, created a void which numerous Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) stepped in to fill.
These NGOs provided victims with financial support and
relief, and most importantly, offered them mental relief
and treatment. To support these activities financially, ef-
forts were made to bring forward the issue of psycho-
trauma to the attention of the fundraisers. These efforts
led to the establishment of the Israeli Trauma Coalition
(ITC), which is comprised of seven leading NGOs in the
fields of psycho-trauma. The ITC goals were to provide
direct mental aid to patients, to educate and train interven-
tion teams, and to promote resilience among victimized
populations across the country [3].
The next major milestone in the evolution of the Israeli
mental health care system was registered during the Second
Lebanon War (2006). The war demonstrated the extent to
which the civilian population in the home front can be
victimized in a short period of time. Moreover, the fact
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Israel, an area known to be relatively rural, combined with
the high-trajectory nature of the threat (e.g. rockets), cre-
ated a logistical challenge of providing mental care for the
population. The Stress Site model at the hospitals was
largely inadequate. To overcome this insufficiency, a collabor-
ation between the Ministry of Health and the Israeli Civil
Defense Authority (The Home Front Command (HFC) of
the Israeli Defense Forces) led to the conceptualization of
the Community Stress & Anxiety Center (CSAC) model.
The rationale behind this concept was four-fold: (A) the
provision of mental care closer to patients’ homes in a com-
munal environment that promoted continuity of care post-
crisis; (B) reduction of workload in hospitals in both Stress
Sites and ERs; (C) reducing the occupancy duration of am-
bulances by shortcutting transit distances, thus allowing for
the restriction of rocket threats to moving ambulances,
while at the same time ensuring the availability of the am-
bulances for other calls; and (D) reducing the stigmatization
associated with being treated for mental distress [9,10].
Two weeks into the armed conflict, the mental health
division of the HFC opened five CSACs in the northern
region (namely in Carmiel, Ma’alot, Tiberius, Kiryat-Ata
and Kibbutz Lohamei HaGeta’ot). The professional
personnel in these centers was comprised of mental health
and medical officers of the HFC. Later on, rocket threat
led to the shut down of local mental health clinics, which
diverted help seekers to the CSACs and created a need for
additional caregivers to operate these centers. The Israeli
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), or Magen-David
Adom (Israel’s Red Cross), were guided in the transporta-
tion of ASR and anxiety victims to the CSACs instead of
hospitals. In a relatively short period, news about these
centers spread sufficiently enough so that people sought
help in them by themselves. In total, 534 casualties were
treated in these centers in the course of a month [9,10].
In spite of the difficulties encountered in pitching the
concept of the CSAC to local mayors with the objective of
engaging them in logistically supporting these centers, the
overall post-war impression of the CSAC model was as a
success. Not only that, but another dramatic achievement
was accomplished. In the aftermath of the war, the Israeli
National Insurance Institute (Israel’s social security)
expressed its consent to subsidize a series of a dozen psy-
chological therapy sessions to any casualty without the
need to provide evidence of eligibility under the “victim of
hostilities” criterion. Usually, without this formal recogni-
tion by the state, patients would have difficulties securing
financial and other state-subsidized aid and would have to
rely on NGOs to provide them with these services. Up
until this new regulation by the Israeli National Insurance
Institute, it was up to the ITC to financially assist psycho-
traumatic victims, which they did with their fundraising of
more than 2 million US dollars [3]. Under the dozen-treatment program, services were provided for patients in
designated centers established in general hospitals after
the war. These centers continued to provide hundreds of
people with services for up to three years after the war
had ended. Yet despite their success, due to budgetary re-
strictions, these centers were closed and reopened only
following the Gaza conflict of 2012 (see following).
Another significant advancement brought about in the
wake of the Second Lebanon War was in the psycho-
therapy methods employed in the CSACs. Instead of
debriefing and pharmaceutically quieting help seekers, a
more effective approach of emotional regulation, mental
balancing and reinstating normative functioning was
adopted. In this approach, much emphasis is placed on
patient empowerment and the establishment of an appro-
priate support structure for each patient. The treatment of
a patient begins with a general assessment of his/her con-
dition according to protocols developed by Dr. Ilan Kutz
[11]. This assessment allows for the prediction of ASD de-
velopment down the road, as well as to identify patients in
need of closer monitoring. Following patient assessment, a
wide array of psychotherapy methods can be employed,
including Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Somatic
Experiencing (SE) and Eye-Movement Desensitization and
Reprocessing (EMDR). Pharmaceutical interventions are
sweepingly avoided, except for extreme situations, and
even then, Benzodiazepines are not prescribed. In
addition, more often than not, the debriefing of the trau-
matic event would not take place during this first stage of
mental care, rather it would be postponed to a later stage
of recovery. Lastly, the revised psychotherapy protocols
dictate a dyadic approach for childcare, in which large em-
phasis is placed on parents’ instruction and empowerment
to cope with the child in distress. This is done in light of
research findings suggesting that better pyscho-indication
and self-efficacy perceptions of parents allow for a better
recuperation of the distressed child [12].
The good outcome experienced with the CSAC model
during the Second Lebanon War promoted the
institutionalization of the CSAC concept with a new pro-
cedure written and published by the Health Ministry. This
procedure laid down the principles of responsibility and
authority in establishing and maintaining a CSAC in any
given location. The procedure detailed the different ap-
provals needed to be obtained in order to authorize the
use of a designated site as a CSAC. For instance, it had to
be accessible to ambulances and had to be approved for
safety by the HFC. The procedure also described the ne-
cessary equipment and staff to operate a CSAC. The ori-
ginal decision was to allocate professional work force
from within the health establishment, i.e. hospitals and
clinics. Additional assistance by non-medical caregivers
was to be allocated by the local welfare and education ser-
vices. In addition, a certain amount of responsibility was
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decentralize the system and generate a more efficient
management mechanism.
The conclusions drawn in light of the Second Lebanon
War also resulted in a new concept for Resilience Centers.
The goal of the Resilience Centers was to provide a public
resilience build up throughout all three stages of crisis
management: (A) prevention - training and educating pro-
fessionals and volunteers, early identification of vulnerable
populations, promotion of mental resilience, etc. (B) re-
sponse - providing mental health care during emergency
in the CSAC model operated by the Resilience Center
staff; and (C) recovery - providing ongoing treatment for
stress patients in a post-trauma setting similar in concept
to that applied in the designated centers that operated in
hospitals following the Second Lebanon War.
The original intent was to have a national deployment
of these centers, but fiscal constraints allowed for only a
few. It was therefore decided to concentrate these efforts
in the Gaza Envelope settlements surrounding the Gaza
Strip. A tender was published for the proposition of con-
ceptual frameworks. The awarded concept was that of
the Ministry of Health and the Israeli Trauma Coalition.
The Health Ministry was assigned by the Prime Minister
to lead the establishment efforts and to act as the regula-
tor for these proceedings in a joint venture with other
governmental ministries. At the end of the process, five
Resilience Centers were founded in the Gaza Envelope,
namely in in the Regional Council (RC) of Eshkol, RC of
Sdot-Negev, RC of Sha’ar Ha’Negev, RC of Hof Ashkelon
and the city of Sderot. In other regions of the country,
the task of everyday provision of mental health treat-
ment was assigned to independent NGOs that were op-
erating under the umbrella of the ITC [3].
By the end of 2008, the concept of the Resilience Cen-
ters was put to test with the eruption of the first in a
series of three Gaza conflicts to date. During this oper-
ation, nicknamed “Cast Lead”, the Resilience Centers
shifted from prevention to response mode and provided
mental care to patients seeking their service. To over-
come the surge in demands, an additional nine CSACs
were opened in cities and towns in the Gaza Envelope
region. Regional psychiatric hospitals assisted with pro-
fessional caregivers, and the four Health Management
Organizations (a.k.a. “sick funds”) supplemented general
practitioners who performed physical examination of pa-
tients. Overall, these 14 centers and sites operated effect-
ively and maintained their operations in accordance with
procedures and treatment protocols. As a matter of fact,
these centers were so effective that a noticeable change
in the hospital-to-CSAC distribution of patients was
generated. During the Second Lebanon War, only a third
of the patients attended the CSACs (as opposed to the
two-third that attended hospitals), whereas during “CastLead” operation, these ratios were swapped and two-
thirds of patients attended the CSACs.
However, the “Cast Lead” operation did not go by
without difficulties and challenges. First, the intervention
teams were faced with a substantial challenge in the ac-
commodation of their treatment protocols designed for
a single session to returning patients, i.e., patients who
were treated in the past and were triggered to seek men-
tal care due to revisited trauma. Second, the psychiatric
hospitals assisting with professional work force com-
plained of shortages in labor for their routine work.
Third, CSACs staff were forced to travel long distances
in non-protected vehicles, making their experience
stressful on its own. Fourth, on numerous occasions,
CSACs staff pointed out that occasionally, there was a
significant drop in casualty admittance to the CSAC,
causing temporary unemployment and a waste of labor.
Lastly, Resilience Centers positioned in low density
regional councils reported difficulties of the population
to reach and return from these centers, especially under
rocket threats. To overcome this problem, a decision
was made during the course of the conflict to generate
localized capabilities to provide initial care in each town-
ship, mainly through local social services, and to use the
Resilience Center as a back post from which teams could
be dispatched upon request.
In the aftermath of “Cast Lead” operation, a systematic
process was initiated to map and designate appropriate sites
around the country to serve as CSACs. To date, 56 sites
have been selected, examined and approved. Efforts are
made to recruit and integrate professional teams of health
and welfare workers, and to have them trained and ready to
operate these centers in the occurrence of future crisis. In
addition, following the “Cast Lead” operation, the Ministry
of Health initiated a campaign to appoint sites that could
serve as designated centers for ongoing treatment, in a
similar manner to the concept employed during the Second
Lebanon War. Once a patient finalizes the treatment at the
CSAC, he is handed a form filled and signed by the care-
giver. This form indicates what type of intervention the pa-
tient underwent, whether or not the patient requires
further treatment, and the caregiver’s recommendations for
this ongoing treatment. Citizens can approach the desig-
nated treatment centers, which are available across the
country, with this form and obtain the required therapy.
The appointment of these treatment centers is a joint ven-
ture of the ministry with the Israeli National Insurance In-
stitute and is conducted in a manner that ensures that
patients would be eligible for the subsidized dozen treat-
ments. This is an ongoing effort to reinstate the former suc-
cessful program that was awarded to psycho-trauma
victims following the Second Lebanon War.
The second time the Emergency Mental Health Ser-
vices array was put to the test was in 2012 when the
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Strip. The response during this crisis was similar to that
observed in the previous conflict. However, with the
introduction of the “Iron Dome” missile defense system
into the battlefield, an overall reduction in help-seeking
rates was observed. On the other hand, telephone-based
mental assistance (e.g. “hotlines”) rose. People seemed to
prefer having their tensions relieved in the comfort and
assurance of their own homes instead of having to travel
to a nearby, designated center. This phenomenon neces-
sitated that call centers pay closer attention to the men-
tal distress situation of callers and refer those in a more
serious condition to the CSACs (or alternatively dispatch
the CSAC staff to the caller) in order to allow for ad-
equate psychological intervention.
In addition, operation “Pillar of Defense” was a turning
point with respect to the handling of work force. Simi-
larly to “Cast Lead,” intervention teams continued to
complain of unemployment during specific hours of the
day, especially during the night. Additionally, complaints
were made concerning the unnecessary mandatory pres-
ence of a psychiatrist in each shift. Consequently, shifts
were reduced from a 24/7 to a 08:00–20:00 format, and
a surge capacity approach was adopted in which staff
numbers were reduced and could be increased upon de-
mand. The presence of a psychiatrist in each CSAC
working shift was made optional.
With the dust settling after the “Pillar of Defense” op-
eration, a rethink of operations was done concerning the
appointment of responsibility over the management of
the emergency mental health system. In a series of delib-
erations, the decision was made to shift the responsibil-
ity from the Ministry of Health to the local authorities,
leaving the first to act solely as a regulator. The CSAC
model was refurbished and was given a new name -
Mental Health Support Centers (MHSC) [13]. Acknow-
ledging the fact that local mayors and heads of regional
councils were more capable in understanding their local
public and managing its resources, they were assigned
with the responsibility to overlook the process of the es-
tablishment of MHSCs in their respective municipalities.
Nevertheless, this shift in responsibility was greeted with
ambivalence, largely because governors assumed differ-
ent levels of responsibility, resulting for some in an ever
more political decision-making process.
The new model was put to the test during the recent
“Protective Edge” operation (July-August, 2014). While
some claimed some “chaos” in the system, noticeable
mostly through the regression in hospital-to-MHSC distri-
bution rates achieved in the previous conflict, some ar-
gued that overall, this new approach was justified. Those
favoring this notion referred to the continued overall drop
in attendance rates to stress-relief sites and the introduc-
tion of tele-media therapy in two centers in the city ofNetivot and the RC of Eshkol. The latter allowed for the
provision of mental care to remote settlements next to the
Gaza border that had been otherwise inaccessible.
In order to balance the system, the department of
Emergency Mental Health Services in the Ministry of
Health was tasked with a regulatory role to oversee the
system as a whole, and was also responsible for the
provision of training and educational programs to main-
tain eligibility among caregivers. Each site established for
the provision of mental health care underwent such
training, and at each site, a point-of-contact was desig-
nated to be responsible for maintaining this capability.
The current status and future challenges
The current model of the Emergency Mental Health
Services in Israel can be divided into three components:
(a) immediate, on-site intervention administered by local
teams; (b) Mental Health Support Centers (MHSCs) oper-
ating independently or as part of a Resilience Center to
provide readily available, accessible, stigma-free treatment
to anyone experiencing mental distress or anxiety; (c) on-
going efforts to promote public resilience during routine
times through Resilience Centers and other NGOs.
The emergency mental health system, which has been
established in Israel over the course of forty years, has
grown through a systematic process of lesson learning
from actual experiences with threats. It would be fair to
argue that this process of maturation has placed the Is-
raeli system in an example-setting position to other
countries embarking on a quest of generating a similar
mechanism. It is important to note that the emergency
mental health provision in Israel has rooted itself in solid
grounds by means of change in its discourse. Terms
such as anxiety and stress are replaced with terms such
as mental support. This is not merely semantics. This
change constitutes a profound understanding of the
complexity of mental health provision to victimized pop-
ulations over a prolonged period, and encompasses all
the different aspects of mental distress and hardship pre-
sented by different people during crisis. It also covers
the recent developments in treatment administration
through ever advancing means, such as telecommunica-
tion, and making mental aid an accessible commodity to
the public [14]. It is the intention of the Ministry of
Health to develop the tele-media capabilities demon-
strated in the last Gaza conflict, which proved highly ef-
fective in providing mental health care to victims.
Nonetheless, the Israeli emergency mental health system
faces several challenges in the near future. As described
earlier, in the aftermath of the last conflict in Gaza, it be-
came clear that alterations in the current structure of the
system are necessary. These changes will mostly draw
from previous architectures of the system in order to re-
trieve elements that were beneficial in the past. In
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gration between the local authorities and the different
governmental agencies in order to ensure continuity, and
promote the cooperation around the MHSC concept.
Lastly, efforts should be invested in establishing a na-
tional training organization responsible for preparing and
training local MHSC teams. This step would help in gener-
ating a comprehensive approach to the harmonization of
the mental health system in Israel to the benefit of its users.
Appendix A
Brief description of the armed conflicts presented in
the paper from the Israeli perspectivea
1979 Naharya terror attack
The 1979 Nahariya attack (codenamed by its perpetrators
as the Nasser Operation) was a raid by four Palestine Liber-
ation Front (PLF) militants in Nahariya, Israel on April 22,
1979. The group, led by 16-year-old Samir Kuntar, used a
small, 55 horsepower (41 kW) boat to travel from Tyre,
Lebanon to Israel. The raid resulted in the deaths of four
Israelis, including a father and two of his young children.
This terror attack is regarded as one of the most brutal ter-
ror attacks in the history of Israel.
1980’s northern border attacks
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for the purpose
of attacking the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
giving rise to the 1982 Lebanon War. From January 1984
until 1997, numerous launchings of rockets and mortars
and nine incidents of terrorist invasions into Israeli north-
ern settlements were registered. The worst incident took
place on 25 November 1987 and was nicknamed “Night of
the Gliders” in which two Palestinian guerrillas infiltrated
into Israel from South Lebanon using hang gliders to
launch a surprise attack against the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF). Earlier conflicts prior to the 1982 Israeli invasion,
include Operation Litani’s attempt to eradicate the PLO
bases from Lebanon and support Christian Maronite mili-
tias, following constant attacks from the PLO on the civil-
ian population of Galilee (Northern Israel). The 1982
invasion resulted in the creation of the Security Zone and
the PLO departure from Lebanon. The creation of the Se-
curity Zone in South Lebanon has benefited the civilian
Israeli population as the Galilee has suffered less violent
attacks by Hezbollah (9 Israeli civilians killed and at least
248 wounded) than previously by PLO in the 1970s (hun-
dreds of Israeli civilian casualties). Despite Israel’s success
in eradicating PLO bases and partial withdraw in 1985,
the Israeli invasion had actually increased the severity of
conflict with local Lebanese militias and resulted in the
consolidation of several local Shia Muslim movements in
Lebanon, including Hezbollah and Amal, from a previ-
ously unorganized guerrilla movement in the south. Overthe years, military casualties of both sides grew higher, as
both parties used more modern weaponry, and Hezbollah
progressed in its tactics. By the early 1990s, Hezbollah,
with support from Syria and Iran, emerged as the leading
group and military power, monopolizing the directorship
of the guerrilla activity in South Lebanon.
The first Intifada (1987–1991)
The First Intifada was a Palestinian uprising against
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories,
which lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid
Conference in 1991, though some date its conclusion to
1993, with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The uprising
included general strikes, boycotts of Israeli civil administra-
tion institutions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, civil
disobedience in the face of army orders, and an economic
boycott consisting of refusal to work in Israeli settlements
on Israeli products, refusal to pay taxes, refusal to drive
Palestinian cars with Israeli licenses, graffiti, barricading,
and widespread throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails
at the IDF and its infrastructure within the Palestinian ter-
ritories. Over six years the Israeli Defense Forces killed an
estimated 1,162–1,204 Palestinians while Palestinians killed
100 Israeli civilians and 60 IDF personnel and injured more
than 1,400 Israeli civilians and 1,700 soldiers.
The First Gulf War (1991)
The Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991),
was a war waged by coalition forces from 34 nations led
by the United States against Iraq in response to Iraq’s
invasion and annexation of Kuwait. As part of the
armed conflict, Iraq launched Scud missiles against
Coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against
Israel in hope to provoke a military response from
Israel. The Scud missiles targeting Israel were relatively
ineffective, as firing at an extreme range resulted in a
dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. According
to the Jewish Virtual Library, a total of 74 Israelis died
as a result of the Iraqi attacks: two directly and the rest
from suffocation and heart attacks. Approximately 230
Israelis were injured. Extensive property damage was
also caused, and according to Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, “Damage to general property consisted of 1,302
houses, 6,142 apartments, 23 public buildings, 200
shops and 50 cars.” It was feared that Iraq would fire
missiles filled with nerve agents such as sarin. As a
result, Israel’s government issued gas masks to its citi-
zens. When the first Iraqi missiles hit Israel, some
people injected themselves with an antidote for nerve
gas. It has been suggested that the sturdy construction
techniques used in Israeli cities, coupled with the fact
that Scuds were only launched at night, played an im-
portant role in limiting the number of casualties from
Scud attacks.
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The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada,
was the second Palestinian uprising against Israel – a
period of intensified Israeli-Palestinian violence. It started
in September 2000, when Ariel Sharon (later the prime
minister of Israel) made a visit to the Temple Mount, seen
by Palestinians as highly provocative. Both parties inflicted
high numbers of casualties among civilians as well as com-
batants: the Palestinians by numerous suicide bombing
and gunfire; the Israelis by tank and gunfire and air attacks,
by numerous targeted killings, and by harsh reactions on
demonstrations. The death toll, including both military
and civilian, is estimated to be about 3,000 Palestinians and
1,000 Israelis, as well as 64 foreigners. Some consider the
Sharm el-Sheikh Summit on February 8, 2005, the end of
the Second Intifada, when President Mahmoud Abbas and
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreed to stop all acts of vio-
lence against Israelis and Palestinians and reaffirmed their
commitment to the Roadmap for peace.
The Second Lebanon War (2006)
The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the Second Lebanon
War, was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon, northern
Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were
Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The
conflict started on 12 July 2006 and continued until a
United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the
morning of 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on
8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of
Lebanon. The conflict was precipitated by the Zar’it-
Shtula incident on 12 July 2006, resulting with the ab-
duction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah to Lebanon.
Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners
held by Israel in exchange for the release of the abducted
soldiers. Israel refused and responded with airstrikes and
artillery fire on targets in Lebanon followed by a ground
invasion of southern Lebanon. During the war, Hezbollah
fired between 3,970 and 4,228 rockets at a rate of more
than 100 per day, unprecedented since the Iran-Iraq war.
An estimated 23% of these rockets hit cities and built-up
areas across northern Israel, while the remainder hit
open areas. One million Israelis had to stay near or in
bomb shelters or security rooms, with some 250,000 ci-
vilians evacuating the north and relocating to other areas
of the country. The conflict is believed to have killed be-
tween 1,191 and 1,300 Lebanese people and 165 Israelis.
Operation “Cast Lead” (2009)
The Gaza War, also known as Operation Cast Lead,
was a three-week armed conflict between Palestinians in
the Gaza Strip and Israel that began on 27 December,
2008 and ended on 18 January, 2009 in a unilateral
ceasefire. Israel’s stated goal was to stop rocket fire into
Israel and weapons smuggling into the Gaza strip. Thestrike range of Hamas rockets had increased from 16 km
(9.9 mi) to 40 km (25 mi) since early 2008 with the use
of improved Qassam and factory-made rockets. As of
January 13, 2009, Palestinian militants had launched
approximately 565 rockets and 200 mortars at Israel
since the beginning of the conflict, according to Israeli
security sources. The rockets killed three civilians and
one IDF soldier and wounded 182 people, with another
584 people suffering from shock and anxiety. Besides
being hit with rockets fired from Gaza, Israel experi-
enced other attacks along the borders with Lebanon
and Syria.
Operation “Pillar of Defense” (2012)
Operation Pillar of Defense was an eight-day Israel
Defense Forces (IDF) operation in the Hamas-governed
Gaza Strip, which began on 14 November 2012 with the
killing of Ahmed Jabari, chief of the Gaza military wing
of Hamas. The operation was preceded by a period with
a number of mutual Israeli–Palestinian responsive attacks.
During the operation, Hamas, the Al-Qassam Brigades
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) further intensi-
fied their rocket, firing over 1,456 rockets into Israel.
About 421 rockets were intercepted by Israel’s Iron
Dome missile defense system, another 142 fell on Gaza
itself, 875 fell in open areas, and 58 hit urban areas in
Israel. By the end of the operation, six Israelis had been
killed, two hundred forty were injured. In addition, a
bus in Tel-Aviv was bombed by an Arab-Israeli, injuring
28 civilians.
Operation “Protective Edge” (2014)
Operation Protective Edge was a seven-week conflict
in the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip, which began on 8
July 2014. The stated aim of the Israeli operation was to
stop rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, which increased
after an Israeli crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank
was launched following the kidnapping and murder of
three Israeli teenagers by two Hamas members. As in
previous conflicts, the Palestinian terror groups launched
rockets and mortars into Israel, reaching record breaking
ranges with rockets fired all the way to Haifa in the
north. According to the IDF, of all the 4,564 projectiles
fired at Israel, 224 hit built-up areas, 735 were inter-
cepted by the Iron Dome, 875 fell inside Gaza and the
rest fell in open territory or failed to launch. In Israel,
an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 citizens temporarily fled
their homes due to the threat of rocket and mortar
attacks. Between 2,127 and 2,192 Gazans were killed
(including 513 children) and between 10,895 and 11,100
were wounded. Sixty-six Israeli soldiers, 5 Israeli civilians
(including one child) and one Thai civilian were killed, as
well as 469 IDF soldiers and 261 Israeli civilians that were
injured.
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Additional Roles of the Mental Health Services
during Emergencies
The department of emergency mental health services in
the Ministry of Health is tasked with additional responsi-
bilities. First, it is involved in international relief aid during
crises by supporting the mental health aspects of Israeli
relief delegation. Examples for such contributions are the
2004 Sri Lanka Tsunami disaster, The 2004 Beslan (Russia)
school hostage crisis, and the 2005 New-Orleans disaster
following Hurricane Katrina.
Second, the department assist the ministerial decision
making process concerning mass-psychology in crisis
situation. The most recent example for this is the on-
going Ebola crisis (2014), which necessitated risk com-
munication adaptation to prevent and mitigate potential
psycho-trauma effects to the public. This was also the
case with the SARS pandemic in 2003, the Avian Flu
scare in 2005 and the Swine Flu pandemic in 2009.
Lastly, the division oversees the ongoing recovery efforts
of pyscho-trauma victims post-crisis. This activity involves
doctrinal development and procedural work, designating
and training professional workforce, relief work in assist-
ing the recuperation of patients towards overcoming their
trauma, e.g., by initiating tension-abatement vacations
outside of threat zones, and “help the helpers” programs
to assist stress remission among mental health providers
and promote their resilience in future experiences with
this complicated, but important, work.
Endnotes
aInformation retrieved from Wikipedia. http://en.
wikipedia.org/. Accessed January 11th, 2015.
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